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AWARDING ATTORNEY'S FEES TO 
ENVIRONMENTAL PLAINTIFFS UNDER A PRIVATE 
ATTORNEY GENERAL THEORY 
Scott J. Jordan* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
A private attorney general is a private individual who steps for-
ward to defend the public interest when the government does not. 
Governmental attorneys general and other governmental agencies 
cannot, or will not, always enforce all of the laws because they have 
limited resources and are influenced by political considerations. The 
result is that "most of the responsibility for enforcement [of statutes] 
has to rest upon private citizens, who must go to court to prove a 
violation of the law. "1 
Congress and the courts have decided that private attorneys gen-
eral must be allowed to participate in various types of legal pro-
ceedings. Courts have broadened standing to allow private attorneys 
general to bring suits.2 Many governmental agencies allow private 
attorneys general into agency proceedings.3 Further, Congress has 
recognized the importance of private enforcement of statutes by 
providing for private causes of action in a wide variety of laws. 4 
*Topics Editor, 1986-1987, BOSTON COLLEGE ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS LAW REVIEW. 
1 122 CONGo REC. S 33,313 (daily ed. September 29, 1976) (Statement of Sen. 'funney). 
2 U.S. V. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 193 (1974) (Stewart, J., concurring) ("To be sure 
standing barriers have been sUbstantially lowered in the last three decades"). See also United 
States V. SCRAP, 412 U.S. 669 (1973) (Extreme leniency in finding standing: organization 
granted standing in Interstate Commerce Commission rate-setting proceeding because in-
creased rates would discourage recycling which would cause environmental degradation of 
natural areas including areas used by plaintiff's members for recreation). 
3 For example, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission allows public interest plaintiffs 
to intervene in agency proceedings under 18 C.F.R. § 385.214(b)(2)(iii) and 
§ 385.906(c)(2)(ii)(1986). 
4 See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. §§ 15, 26 (1982) (anti-trust acts); 16 U.S.C. § 1540(g) (1982) (Endan-
gered Species Act); 33 U.S.C. § 1515 (1982) (Deepwater Ports Act). 
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But merely granting private attorneys general a right to enforce 
the laws is not sufficient. They must also have the resources to 
exercise the right. Litigation is extremely expensive and public 
interest plaintiffs will not always be able to finance their suits. One 
source of resources is attorney's fee awards granted by courts. Fee 
awards provide the resources to private attorneys general in two 
ways. First, awards provide the public interest plaintiff with the 
opportunity to recover attorneys fees if he wins. Without this op-
portunity, the private plaintiff may decide that the burdens of liti-
gation outweigh the benefits to him. The plaintiff may decide not to 
spend thousands of dollars to enforce the law because, even if he is 
totally successful, the victory is not worth that much money to him 
personally. Second, fee awards from past cases can fund future public 
interest litigation by the successful plaintiff. In many cases, an in-
dividual who wishes to act to protect the public interest cannot 
because the individual lacks the resources to pay for litigation. At-
torney fee awards can provide the funding for public interest law 
firms that will use their resources to protect public rights. 5 
Congress and the courts recognize the importance of fee awards. 
The legislative histories of statutory fee provisions express the im-
portance of fee awards in ensuring the fulfillment of statutory policy. 6 
The Supreme Court, in Hall v. Cole, 7 recognized that refusing to 
award fees can be "tantamount to repealing the [statute] itself by 
frustrating its basic purpose."8 
Granting fee awards to private attorneys general is also fair to 
the private citizens who volunteer to champion public rights. Since 
society has chosen to leave much of the enforcement of its laws in 
the hands of private parties, the courts should ensure that private 
attorneys general are not bearing the full burden of protecting the 
public interest. "Noone expects a policeman, or an officeholder, to 
pay for the privilege of enforcing the law. It should be no different 
for a private citizen . . . ."9 
These arguments are especially pertinent to environmental plain-
tiffs. Since environmental plaintiffs protect the environment in which 
5 See Serrano v. Priest, 20 Cal. 3d 25, 44, 569 P.2d 1303, 1313-14 (1977). 
6 See, e.g., Hart-Scott-Rodino Anti-Trust Improvements Act, H.R. Rep. No. 499, 94th 
Cong., 2d Sess. 18, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONGo & ADMIN. NEWS 2572,2588-90; Civil 
Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act, S. Rep. No. 1011, 94th Congo 2d Sess. 2-3, reprinted in 
1976 U.S. CODE CONGo & ADMIN. NEWS 5908, 5910. 
7412 U.S. 1 (1973). 
8412 U.S. at 13 (citing Cole V. Hall, 462 F. 2d 777, 780-81 (1972) involving Labor-Manage-
ment Reporting and Disclosure Act, 29 U.S.C. § 412 (1972». 
• See supra note 1 at S 33,313. 
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we all live, their efforts benefit us all. For example, when an envi-
ronmental lawsuit stops a factory from polluting the air, all people 
who breathe that air are benefited. Even if an environmental plaintiff 
is motivated solely by self-interest, the benefits of the suit are en-
joyed by others. 10 Attorney's fee awards are especially important in 
environmental cases, because the remedy is often injunctive relief 
rather than money damages. The plaintiff does not win funds which 
could cover the costs of litigation, and the plaintiff must bear the 
entire financial burden of the suit. Thus, it is crucial that the judicial 
system make resources available to private attorneys general who 
bring suit to enforce environmental laws. 
In the late 1960's and early 1970's, federal courts recognized the 
importance of awarding attorney's fees to public interest plaintiffs 
and developed a "private attorney general" exception to the general 
rule that courts do not shift the attorney's fees of one party onto 
another.11 This exception allowed courts to award attorney's fees to 
plaintiffs who brought suits to enforce statutes and, in so doing, 
served the public interest. In 1975, in Alyeska Pipeline v. Wilder-
ness Society,12 the United States Supreme Court held that federal 
courts could not award attorney's fees under the private attorney 
general exception unless there was a statute that specifically granted 
the discretion to do so. The Alyeska decision ended what some 
commentators had seen as a promising tool with which public interest 
groups could finance their litigation. 13 
This Comment will discuss why the private attorney general ex-
ception should be reinstated as a basis for fee awards in the federal 
courts. Section II of this Comment will discuss the general American 
rule of not awarding fees and the exceptions to it that federal courts 
have developed. Section III will look at the development of the 
private attorney general exception and compare it to other equitable 
exceptions. Section IV will discuss the Alyeska opinion and the 
Court's reasons for holding that granting attorney's fees to private 
attorneys general is beyond the discretion of courts. Section V will 
critique the Alyeska opinion as contrary to the traditional view of 
federal courts' power to award fees and, more generally, to exercise 
10 This is not to say that the environmental plaintiff does not have some personal interest 
in the benefit he seeks. Obviously he does since he took the initiative to bring the suit. 
Further, a plaintiff must have some special interest to have standing. 
11 See infra notes 42-53 and accompanying text. 
12421 U.S. 240 (1975). 
13 See King & Plater, The Right To Counsel Fees In Public Interest Environmental Liti-
gation, TENN. L. REV. 27, 55-56 (1973). 
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discretion in applying statutes. Further, Section V will argue that 
the Alyeska opinion is internally inconsistent. Finally, Section VI 
will discuss why courts should use their discretion to revive the 
private attorney general exception. 
Although eleven years have passed since the Alyeska opinion was 
handed down, the private attorney general exception is not a dead 
issue. Shortly after Alyeska, California state courts adopted the 
private attorney general exception. 14 Since then, California courts 
have strongly upheld it. 15 Further, President Reagan has emphasized 
recently that the federal government should encourage private citi-
zens to perform functions that have been handled by the govern-
ment. Encouragement of private attorneys general by allowing fee 
awards is in line with this trend. 16 Finally, since 1975, many court 
decisions have come down that are contrary to the reasoning that 
the Alyeska court followed in striking down the private attorney 
general exception. 17 
II. AWARDING ATTORNEY'S FEES: THE GENERAL RULE AND ITS 
EQUITABLE EXCEPTIONS 
A. The American Rule and the English Rule 
Justice is not free. Any individual who wants justice must pay the 
price of seeking it. The price is the cost of attorney's fees and 
litigation expenses that must be borne by any party who prosecutes 
or defends a suit. There is nothing inherently wrong with this. Our 
adversariallegal system imposes costs on society; it is fair that some 
of the costs are borne by the parties that benefit by using the judicial 
system to settle their disputes. It follows that each party should pay 
his own attorney's fees. This is the rationale of the "American rule:" 
that under normal circumstances, each party is liable for his own 
attorney's fees. 1s 
The American rule is not followed in all countries. In England, for 
example, courts customarily award fees to the prevailing party. This 
14 Serrano v. Priest, 20 Cal 3d. 25, 569 P.2d 1303 (1977). 
15 See infra discussion of California's treatment of the private attorney general exception 
at text accompanying notes 132-138. 
16 See infra notes 130-131 and accompanying text. 
17 See discussion in Section V and especially discussion of Romero-Barcelo v. Weinberger, 
456 U.S. 305 (1982) in text accompanying notes 83-87. 
18 Ruckelshaus v. Sierra Club, 463 U.S. 680, 683-4 (1983); Alyeska Pipeline v. Wilderness 
Society, 421 U.S. 240, 247 (1975); Fleischmann Distilling Corp. v. Maier Brewing Co., 386 
U.S. 714, 717 (1967). 
1987] ATTORNEY'S FEES 291 
"English rule" has a statutory basis that dates back to 1275. 19 The 
English rule regards attorney's fees as a recoverable element of 
damages similar to medical expenses, automobile repair bills, and 
pain and suffering. The underlying rationale is the opposite of that 
of the American rule: the costs of justice should be borne by the 
losing party because that party imposed the costs onto the other 
party by forcing the dispute to be resolved in court. Thus, in an auto 
accident, the negligent defendant caused damage to the plaintiff's 
person by injuring him, his car by wrecking it, and his bank account 
by forcing him to pay an attorney to win compensation in the courts. 
This rule is applied consistently in that a defendant may recover fees 
from a plaintiff who prosecutes a losing suit. 20 The plaintiff is liable 
for the defendant's fees because the plaintiff has wrongfully forced 
the defendant to bear those costs. The court simply requires the 
losing party to compensate the winning party for its attorney's fees. 
One major defect of the English rule is that it provides a disin-
centive to litigate disputes. The threat of liability for fees might be 
used as a weapon by both plaintiffs and defendants to prevent a 
dispute from being heard in the courts. For example, a plaintiff 
might be dissuaded from bringing a valid suit because he cannot 
afford to pay the defendant's attorney's fees if he loses. One might 
argue that this result is beneficial in that it tempers the litigious 
nature of parties. This beneficial effect, however, is outweighed by 
the fact that the English rule denies access to the judicial system to 
parties who cannot risk the burden of liability for their opponent's 
fees. 21 This is an additional reason why the American rule is pre-
ferred. 
B. Exceptions to the American Rule 
The American legal system has developed certain exceptions to 
the general rule of no fees. First, many statutes allow attorney's 
fees to be awarded to parties who prosecute cases under the statute's 
substantive provisions. 22 Second, courts have used their "inherent 
19 See King & Plater, supra note 13 at 31-2; Goodhart, Costs, 38 YALE L. REV. 849, 851-4 
(1929). 
20 King & Plater, supra note 13 at 32; Goodhart, supra note 19 at 853. 
21 Fleischmann Distilling Corp. v. Maier Brewing Co., 386 U.S. 714, 718 (1967). 
22 See, e.g., Toxic Substance Control Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2618(d) (1982); Endangered Species 
Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1540(g)(4) (1982); Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7607(f) (1982). See also 
Ruckelshaus v. Sierra Club, 463 U.S. 680,682-83 n.l (1983). 
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equitable power"23 to fashion exceptions to the no fees rule. This 
Comment is primarily concerned with the equitable exceptions. 
The court's equitable power to develop exceptions to the no fees 
rule is based on the maxim that equitable remedies are proper when 
legal remedies are not sufficient to do justice.24 Even when a plain-
tiff's cause of action is granted by law, such as by statute, courts 
obtain concurrent equitable jurisdiction where the available legal 
remedies are inadequate. 25 Thus, courts have developed exceptions 
to the no fees rule when justice has demanded it. These equitable 
exceptions have drawn from the rationales of both the American 
rule and the English rule. 
1. Bad Faith Exception 
The bad faith exception allows fees to be awarded when a party 
has acted in bad faith in the litigation. In Fireman's Fund Insurance 
Company v. Santoro,26 an insurance company forced a claimant to 
prove the negligence of the insured at "a six-day trial in which it 
strongly contested its insured's negligence" even though it knew all 
along that its insured was negligent. 27 The court held that the in-
surance company was liable for the fees of the plaintiff because it 
had litigated in bad faith. The bad faith exception might be seen as 
resting on the rationale of the English rule: that a party should be 
liable for the attorney's fees that he has caused the other party to 
bear. This serves to deter parties from bringing frivolous suits. 
One circuit court has expanded the bad faith exception to allow 
an award of fees where the defendant showed bad faith in his primary 
conduct, that is, the conduct that instigated the lawsuit. In Rolax 
v. Atlantic Coastline Railroad CO.,28 a union was assessed the legal 
fees of a black member who had challenged a labor contract that 
23 Hall v. Cole, 412 U.S. 1, 5 (1973). 
24 Stern v. South Chester Tube Co., 390 U.S. 606, 609 (1968). See also 1 POMEROY, EQUITY 
JURISPRUDENCE, § 217 (5th ed. 1941). Cf Fair Assesment in Real Estate Ass'n. v. McNary, 
454 U.S. 100, 108 (1981) (Courts of equity will stay their hand when legal remedies are 
adequate). 
25 1 POMEROY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE § 217 (5th ed. 1941). 
26 376 F.2d 157 (1st Cir. 1967). 
27 [d. at 160. Similarly, in City Bank of Honolulu v. Rivera Davila, 438 F. 2d 1367 (1st Cir. 
1971), the court awarded fees to the plaintiff because the defendant "greatly and unnecessarily 
prolonged the trial by injecting irrelevancies, by refusing to admit facts patently true, and by 
making statements and later contradicting himself." [d. at 1371. 
See also Note, Use Of Taxable Costs To Regulate The Conduct Of Litigants, 53 Colum. L. 
Rev. 78 (1953). 
28 186 F.2d 473 (4th Cir. 1951). 
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deprived the plaintiff and other black workers of seniority. The court 
stated that fees were justified because "plaintiffs of small means 
[had] been subjected to discriminatory and oppressive conduct by 
[the defendant] which was required, as bargaining agent, to protect 
their interests."29 The Rolax court went on to defend the bad faith 
exception with arguments that are applicable to the private attorney 
general theory. The court stated: 
The vindication of [the plaintiffs'] rights necessarily involves 
greater expense in the employment of counsel to [litigate the 
suit] than the amount involved to the individual plaintiffs would 
justify their paying. In such situation [sic], we think that the 
allowance of counsel fees in a reasonable amount as a part of the 
recoverable costs of the case is a matter resting in the sound 
discretion of the trial judge.30 
This kind of reasoning eventually was used by the courts to support 
the private attorney general exception. 
Courts developed the bad faith exception as an exercise of their 
power to regulate the parties' conduct in lawsuits and, more gen-
erally, their equitable power to prevent injustice. Further, use of 
the bad faith exception has made courts more willing to accept 
broader exceptions to the no fees rule. 31 Court decisions such as 
Rolax32 show this growing willingness to develop more "socially-
conscious" exceptions such as the common benefit exception.33 
2. Common Benefit Exception 
The second exception to the general no fees rule is the common 
benefit exception. Under this exception a court will award fees to a 
plaintiff who has prosecuted a suit that provides a benefit to a specific 
group of people. 34 
29 [d. at 481. See also, Schlein v. Smith, 160 F.2d 22 (D.C. Cir. 1947). But see Shimman v. 
International Union of Operating Eng'rs. Local 18, 744 F.2d 1226, 1231 (6th Cir. 1984). 
30 186 F.2d at 481. 
31 King & Plater, supra note 13 at 41. 
32 186 F.2d 473. 
33 King & Plater, supra note 13 at 43. 
34 For the purpose of this Comment, the common fund exception will be considered part of 
the common benefit exception. The common fund exception was developed in the late 1800's 
and allows an award of fees to a plaintiff who protects or creates a pool of assets for the 
benefit of a specific class of individuals. Sprague v. Ticonic National Bank, 307 U. S. 161 (1939); 
Trustees v. Greenough, 105 U.S. 527 (1881). Considering the common fund exception and the 
common benefit exception as one exception is proper because, conceptually, a "fund" is one 
example of a "benefit" that a plaintiff might provide to the group. 
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The common benefit exception was developed in the late 1960's 
and early 1970's in Mills v. Electric Auto-lite35 and Hall v Cole. 36 
The rationale of the common benefit theory is that of the American 
rule: those who enjoy the benefits of litigation should bear the burden 
of it. Toward that end, courts will only apply the common benefit 
exception when the defendant is an entity that "represents" the 
benefited class. Thus, while the fees are paid by the defendant, the 
effect is to shift the fees from the plaintiff onto the benefited class. 
For example, in Mills, the plaintiff was a shareholder who prose-
cuted a suit against the corporation to vindicate the rights of all 
shareholders. In holding the corporation liable for the plaintiff's fees, 
the court stated that, in shareholder derivative suits, courts will 
allow the expenses of the suit to be spread among the shareholders 
by granting an award against the corporation.37 Similarly, in Hall, 
a union was held liable for fees of one union member who sued the 
union to protect the rights of all union members. As in Mills, the 
award against the union treasury served to shift the burden onto 
the benefited class. 38 
The common benefit exception is a large step beyond the bad faith 
exception. The bad faith exception serves to punish a party who acts 
wrongfully. The common benefit exception serves to reward a party 
for doing something good. Courts applying the common benefit ex-
ception recognize that plaintiffs will sometimes act to protect inter-
ests broader than their own and, in such circumstances, plaintiffs 
should not bear the entire burden of litigation. 
The common benefit exception has some severe limitations. As 
discussed above, it can only be applied when the plaintiff has acted 
to benefit a specific class that is "represented" by the defendant. It 
does not apply when the plaintiff protects the public interest in 
general, unless the public interest happens to coincide with the class 
interest. This limitation in the common benefit exception could lead 
to situations where a plaintiff is not entitled to fees because his 
efforts have benefited too many others. Where a fee award will not 
have the effect of shifting the fee on to the benefited class, the 
plaintiff is forced to bear the full burden. This anamoly led courts to 
develop the private attorney general exception.39 
36 396 U.S. 375 (1970). 
36 412 U.S. 1 (1973). 
87 396 U.S. at 394-5. 
38 412 U.S. at 8-9. 
89 See King & Plater, supra note 13 at 48. 
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III. PRIVATE ATTORNEY GENERAL EXCEPTION 
The private attorney general exception allows fees to be granted 
to plaintiffs who act to protect the interests of the public. The 
exception is based on the belief that governmental attorneys general 
cannot bring all of the suits necessary to protect the public interest. 40 
The equitable basis of the private attorney general exception is a 
hybrid between the bases of the common benefit and bad faith ex-
ceptions. It resembles the common benefit exception in that the 
underlying policy is to shift the fees from the plaintiff since he has 
acted to benefit interests broader than his own. It is like the bad 
faith theory because it shifts the burden of litigation onto the defen-
dant whose conduct has caused the plaintiff to incur the costs of 
litigation. 
The private attorney general exception also has a basis in economic 
reality. Private interests tend to be protected vigorously because 
such interests often are concentrated in a few parties who regard 
the outcome as very important. The result is that these parties have 
a strong incentive to litigate. Conversely, broad public interests 
affect a diffuse group of parties, few of whom have more than a 
small stake in the outcome. This leads to a free rider effect: those 
with only a small stake will tend to leave the burden to others. They 
calculate that their benefits are too small to justify action and that 
their support will not make a difference in the outcome. The result 
is that public interest litigation will be underfunded relative to the 
actual value that it has to society. Fee awards under the private 
attorney general exception serve to correct this imbalance by fund-
ing plaintiffs who protect interests broader than their own.41 
The private attorney general exception was first applied by the 
Supreme Court in Newman v. Piggie Park Enterprises, Inc. 42 The 
Piggie Park Court stated that few plaintiffs would be able to come 
to federal court to protect the public interest if they were required 
to bear the burden of their attorney's fees. 43 For this reason, the 
Court held that a fee award was proper in order to encourage indi-
viduals to seek relief in the courtS. 44 The Supreme Court reaffirmed 
40 122 CONGo REC. S 33,313 (daily ed. September 29, 1976) (Statement of Sen. Tunney). See 
supra text accompanying note 1. 
41 See, e.g., Serrano, 20 Cal. 3d at 46-7, 569 P.2d at 1313 (court's statement of plaintiff's 
argument). 
42 390 U.S. 400 (1968). 
42 [d. at 402. 
44 [d. 
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the Piggie Park decision in 1973 in Northcross v. Board of Education 
of Memphis City Schools. 45 
The fee awards in Piggie Park and Northcross, however, were 
based on statutes that expressly granted the discretion to award 
fees to COurtS. 46 The use of the private attorney general theory as 
an equitable exception began in 1971 in Lee v. Southern Home Sites 
COrp.47 In Lee, a plaintiff was awarded fees in a civil rights action 
even though the statute involved48 did not expressly authorize an 
award of fees. The court held that a fee award was "part of the 
effective remedy a court should fashion to carry out the congressional 
policy embodied in" the statute. 49 
As in Piggie Park and Northcross, the court in Lee reasoned that 
a fee award to the plaintiff was appropriate because the plaintiff had 
furthered the congressional policies that were stated in the statute. 50 
The court held that fees are appropriate in these situations to "en-
sure that individual litigants are willing to act as 'Private Attorneys 
General. "'51 
Following Lee, many of the circuit courts accepted the private 
attorney general theory as an equitable exception to the American 
rule. In addition to the Fifth Circuit in Lee, the First, Sixth, Sev-
enth, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits expressly accepted the private 
attorney general exception. 52 Only the Fourth Circuit expressly re-
jected the private attorney general exception. 53 Thus, by 1975, six 
of the seven cicuits to decide this issue had held that awarding fees 
to private attorneys general was within the court's discretion . 
.. 412 U.S. 427 (1973). 
46 The Piggie Park award was decided under the Civil Rights Act of 1964,42 U.S.C. 2000a-
3(b). 390 U.S. at 401. The Northcross award was decided under the Emergency School Aid 
Act of 1972,20 U.S.C. § 1617. 412 U.S. at 427. It is important to note that these statutes did 
not specifically allow awards based on the private attorney general exception. They only 
contained a general grant of discretion to award fees. The Supreme Court developed the 
private attorney general exception as an exercise of the discretion granted under the statutes. 
47 444 F.2d 143 (5th Cir. 1971). 
48 42 U.S.C. § 1982 (1982). 
49 444 F.2d at 144. See infra notes 88-90 and accompanying text. 
50 444 F.2d at 145. 
51 Id. at 148. 
52 First Circuit: Hoitt v. Vitek, 495 F.2d 219 (1st Cir. 1974), Knight v. Auciello, 453 F.2d 
852 (1st Cir. 1972); Sixth Circuit: Taylor v. Perini, 503 F.2d 899 (6th Cir. 1974); Seventh 
Circuit: Morales v. Haines, 486 F.2d 880 (7th Cir. 1973), Donahue v. Staunton, 471 F.2d 475 
(7th Cir. 1972); Eighth Circuit: Fowler v. Schwarzwalder, 498 F.2d 143 (8th Cir. 1974); Ninth 
Circuit: Brandenburger v. Thompson, 494 F.2d 885 (9th Cir. 1974). 
53 Bradley v. School Bd. of Richmond, 472 F.2d 318 (4th Cir. 1972). 
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IV. ALYESKA PIPELINE V. WILDERNESS SOCIETY 
The growth of the equitable private attorney general exception 
did not continue. In fact, the equitable private attorney general 
exception was killed off in one fell swoop. In Alyeska Pipeline v. 
Wilderness Society, the United States Supreme Court held that the 
federal courts cannot award fees under the equitable private attor-
ney general exception. 54 In Alyeska, several environmental organi-
zations sought a fee award after bringing a successful suit55 to halt 
the Alaskan oil pipeline on the grounds that it violated the Mineral 
Lands Leasing Act56 and the National Environmental Policy Act.57 
Neither statute contained an express provision allowing attorney's 
fee awards. The D.C. Circuit Court awarded fees to the plaintiffs 
under the private attorney general exception. 58 The circuit court 
held that the plaintiffs had benefited the public interest by prevent-
ing the oil pipeline construction from violating federal law. The 
plaintiffs had furthered the policies of NEPA by forcing the Depart-
ment of the Interior to draft an Environmental Impact Statement, 59 
and had enforced the policies of the Mineral Leasing Act by requiring 
the agency to follow the width limitations in that act. 60 
The Supreme Court overturned the circuit court's decision in 
Alyeska.61 It ruled that the circuit court had no discretion to award 
fees on a private attorney general theory since the statutes involved 
did not expressly allow fee awards.62 The Court reasoned that, since 
Congress has traditionally enacted attorney's fees provisions in stat-
utes, any statute that did not contain an express provision should 
be interpreted as prohibiting courts from awarding fees in suits 
brought under that statute.63 Thus, federal courts are not free to 
fashion "new" equitable exceptions to the general no fees rule. 64 This 
clear-cut denial of the private attorney general theory as an excep-
tion to the American rule continues to be the law in federal courts. 65 
54 421 U.S. 240 (1975). 
55 Wilderness Society v. Morton, 479 F.2d 842, cert. denied 411 U.S. 917 (1973). 
66 30 U.S.C. § 185 (1982). 
57 42 U.S.C. § 4321 et. seq. (1982). 
58 495 F.2d 1026 (D.C. Cir. 1974). 
59 Id. at 1034. 
60 Id. at 1032-33. 
61 421 U.S. 240 (1973). 
62 Id. at 269. 
63 Id. 
64 Id. 
65 See, e.g., Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Liebowitz, 730 F.2d 905 (2d Cir. 1984); Pacific Legal 
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It is crucial to remember that the Alyeska court did not simply 
exercise its discretion and decide not to allow fee awards to private 
attorneys general. The Court found that it had no discretion to 
exercise and could not even consider whether private attorney gen-
eral fee awards were proper. 
V. CRITICISM OF ALYESKA 
There are three difficulties with the reasoning of the Alyeska 
decision. First, it goes against the traditional views of courts' power 
to award fees. 66 Second, it is a radical departure from the traditional 
relationship between courts' equitable power and statutes. 67 Third, 
the logic of the Alyeska opinion is internally inconsistent. 68 
A. Alyeska as Contrary to Traditional Equitable Power to Award 
Fees 
The power of courts to award attorney's fees is based on traditional 
equitable doctrine. The United States Supreme Court, in Sprague 
v. Ticonic National Bank,69 stated that "[p]lainly the foundation for 
the historic practice of granting reimbursement for the costs of 
litigation . . . is part of the original authority of the chancellor to do 
equity in a particular situation. "70 The Court has consistently echoed 
this doctrine in subsequent cases.71 In fact, in the Alyeska opinion 
itself, the Court states that the bad faith and common benefit ex-
ceptions are "unquestionably assertions of the inherent power in the 
courts to allow attorney's fees in particular situations, unless forbid-
den by Congress .... "72 Since Alyeska, federal courts have contin-
ued to hold that awarding fees is part of the courts' inherent equi-
table power. 73 
Found. v. Goyan, 664 F.2d 1221 (4th Cir. 1981); Huecker v. Milburn, 538 F.2d 1241 (6th Cir. 
1976). 
66 See infra notes 69-76 and accompanying text. 
f11 See infra notes 77-94 and accompanying text. 
68 See infra notes 95-103 and accompanying text. 
68 307 U.S. 161 (1939). 
70 [d. at 166. 
71 See, e.g., Hall v. Cole, 412 U.S. 1, 4-5 (1973) ("[F]ederal courts, in the exercise of their 
equitable powers, may award attorney's fees when the interests of justice so require"); 
Fleischmann Distilling Corp. v. Maier Brewing Corp., 386 U.S. 714, 718 (1966) (Exceptions 
to the American rule "have been sanctioned by [the U.S. Supreme Court] when overriding 
considerations of justice seemed to compel such a result"). 
72 421 U.S. at 259. 
73 See, e.g., International Ass'n of Heat, Local 17 v. Young, 775 F.2d 870, 872 (7th Cir. 
1985); Haycraft v. Hollenback, 606 F.2d. 128, 133 (6th Cir. 1979); Vandeventer v. Local Union 
No. 513, 579 F.2d. 1373, 1380 (8th Cir. 1978). 
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The holding in Alyeska, however, does not follow this long held 
doctrine. The Alyeska Court found that it did not have the discretion 
to award fees on an equitable basis. The Alyeska Court disregards 
the maxim that courts should use their equitable power to create 
equitable remedies when legal remedies are inadequate. 74 The 
Alyeska holding turns this maxim on its head by finding that the 
lack of a statutory remedy shows congressional intent to limit the 
court's equitable power. This logic is inconsistent with the court's 
duty to use equitable remedies to fill the gaps left by law. 
Further, it is inconsistent for the Alyeska Court to find that the 
court-created common benefit and bad faith exceptions are valid and, 
at the same time, hold that the Court does not have the power to 
accept the private attorney general exception. This inconsistency 
exists because the Court did not merely balance the equities and 
exercise its discretion to decline to accept the private attorney gen-
eral theory. The Court held that it could not accept the private 
attorney general exception because it did not have the discretion to 
accept it. 75 But if the Court does not have the equitable discretion 
to accept the private attorney general exception, it is hard to see 
how the Court could have the discretion to develop the bad faith and 
common benefit exceptions. 76 Since the Court has exercised equitable 
discretion in creating these other equitable exceptions, it should also 
find that it has the discretion to award fees under the private attor-
ney general exception. 
B. Alyeska as Contrary to the traditional Relationship Between 
Statutes and Equitable Discretion 
A second criticism of the Alyeska holding is that it is contrary to 
long held notions of how statutes restrict the equitable discretion of 
courtS. 77 The Alyeska opinion states that since Congress had in-
cluded provisions for awarding fees in certain statutes, courts are 
prohibited from awarding fees under a private attorney general 
theory under other statutes. Courts, however, have traditionally 
held that statutes cannot limit equitable discretion by implication. 
In Porter v. Warner Holding CO.,78 the Supreme Court said that 
7. Alyeska, 421 u.s. at 271. 
75 [d. at 263. 
76 See, id. at 277-78 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
77 [d. at 281-82 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
78 328 U.S. 395 (1946) (Statute allowing court to issue injunctions and compliance orders 
does not prevent court from ordering restitution). 
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"unless a statute in so many words, or by a necessary and inescapable 
inference, restricts the court's jurisdiction in equity, the full scope 
of that jurisdiction is to be recognized and applied."79 This doctrine 
was applied to the awarding of fees in Mills v. Electric Auto-lite 
CO.80 The Electric Auto-lite Court stated that express fee provisions 
"should not be read as denying to the courts the power to award 
counsel fees" where there is no express provision. 81 This argument 
was also accepted by the Court in Hall v. Cole. 82 
Since Alyeska, the Supreme Court held that statutes will not 
restrict equitable discretion by implication in Weinberger v. Romero-
Barcelo. 83 A comparison of Alyeska and Romero-Barcelo is illustra-
tive of the departure that the Alyeska Court made from traditional 
reasoning. 
In Romero-Barcelo, the Governor of Puerto Rico and others sued 
to prevent the Navy from holding bombing practice in an area off 
Puerto Rico. The Navy was operating without the permit required 
by the Federal Water Pollution Control Act. 84 The Court held, as an 
exercise of its equitable discretion, that the bombing could continue 
without a permit even though the permit was expressly required in 
the statute. 85 The Court reasoned that their equitable power re-
mained because there was no express language that removed their 
discretion nor was it a necessary inference. 86 
The Romero-Barcelo decision shows the extreme to which courts 
will go to retain their equitable discretion when acting under stat-
79 Id. at 398. This holding is consistent with courts' general reluctance to rely on congres-
sional silence to interpret congressional intent. "The search for significance in the silence of 
Congress is too often the pursuit of a mirage." Scripps-Howard Radio v. Comm'n, 316 U.S. 
4, 11 (1942) (Court held that it had the power to issue stay orders under § 402(b) of the 
Communications Act of 1934. "[D]enial of such power is not to be inferred merely because 
Congress failed specifically to repeat the general grant of auxiliary powers to the federal 
courts"). 
80 396 U.S. 375 (1970). 
81 I d. at 390-9l. 
82 412 U.S. 1 (1973). 
83 456 U.S. 305 (1982). 
84 Id. at 308-9. 
86 Id. The statute was clear in this requirement: all "discharges of any pollutant" were 
unlawful, unless the discharger had a permit. 33 U.S.C. § 1311(a) (1982). The Navy, as a 
federal agency, is required to obtain a permit in order to lawfully discharge. 33 U.S.C. 
§ 1323(a). "Discharges of any pollutant" was defined as the addition of any "pollutant" into 
the water by any "point source." 33 U.S.C. § 1362(12). Munitions were included in the 
definition of "pollutant," 33 U.S.C. § 1362(6), and "point sources" included vessels, 33 U.S.C. 
§ 1362(14), which the District Court held to include aircraft. Barcelo v. Brown, 478 F. Supp. 
646, 664 (D. P.R. 1979). 
86 456 U.S. at 314. 
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utes. The Court could have held that its discretion was limited by 
the statute to the extent that the Court must prevent statutory 
violations from continuing. 87 It did not. Instead, the Court took the 
stance that its discretion is not limited by any implication, not even 
the strong, even necessary, implication that a statute really means 
what it says. . 
The Alyeska decision stands in stark contrast to this line of rea-
soning. The Court did not base the withdrawal of its discretion on 
any specific language in a specific statute. Instead, it used a two-
step structural analysis of statutes in general. First, the Court rea-
soned that because Congress put express fee provisions in some 
statutes, Congress implicitly intended that fees would not be 
awarded in cases brought under statutes without fee provisions. 
Second, it concluded that this implicit denial of fees at law served 
to restrict the Court's discretion to award fees in equity. 
By making this two-step analysis, the Alyeska Court acted con-: 
trary to the traditional doctrine that courts will be hesitant to find 
statutory limits on equitable discretion. The Romero-Barcelo Court 
retained its discretion even to the point that the discretion allowed 
it to permit violations of a statute. The Alyeska Court found there 
was no judicial discretion to award fees when the statute being 
applied did not discuss attorney's fees at all. The Alyeska decision 
is clearly a major aberration from the doctrine that courts will hes-
itate to interpret statutes as limiting equitable discretion. In fact, 
the Alyeska Court goes out of its way to read an implied limitation 
into the statutes. Furthermore, the decision did not demonstrate a 
new direction in law that courts have followed since Alyeska. It was 
a one time departure that the Court has contradicted in Romero-
Barcelo. 
It might have been more appropriate if the Alyeska Court had 
drawn the opposite implication: that by allowing fee awards in some 
statutes, Congress intended courts to have the discretion to grant 
fees in others as well. This implication was drawn by the Fifth 
Circuit Court of Appeals in Lee v. Southern Homes. 88 In Lee, the 
court stated that in determining whether fees are appropriate under 
a civil rights statute that contains no express fee provision, "courts 
87 See Plater, Statutory Violations and Equitable Discretion, 70 CALF. L. REV. 524, 594 
(1982) ("[O]ver the years, there have been many statutory equity cases in which judges have 
exercised discretion, but never so as to override the specific prohibitions of a statute. Now 
[after Romero-Barcelo] there is one"). 
88 444 F.2d 143 (5th Cir. 1971). 
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must give weight to the actions of Congress in enacting [statutes] 
aimed at very similarly defined social problems. "89 The Lee court 
reasoned that since recent civil rights laws provide for fee awards, 
it was proper to award fees in the other civil rights statutes. 90 In 
Alyeska, the Supreme Court could have used this reasoning to imply 
a remedy of attorney's fee awards in an environmental statute with-
out a fee award provision91 because many other environmental stat-
utes contain fee award provisions. 92 
Congress has since approved of just such an analogy in its Senate 
Report for the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Act of 1976.93 In that 
report, the Senate Committee stated: 
Before May 12, 1975, when the Supreme Court handed down its 
decision in [Alyeska], many lower Federal courts throughout the 
Nation had drawn the obvious analogy between the Reconstruc-
tion Civil Rights Acts and these modern civil rights acts, and, 
following Congressional recognition in the newer statutes of the 
"private Attorney General" concept, were exercising their tra-
ditional equity powers to award attorneys' fees under early civil 
rights laws as well. 94 [footnote omitted][emphasis added] 
This language shows that a court could adopt the Lee analogy without 
thwarting the will of Congress. In fact, such an analogy would follow 
the reasoning of Congress. 
C. Inconsistency within Alyeska 
A third flaw in the Alyeska decision is that it is marred by argu-
ments that are internally inconsistent. The Alyeska Court accepts 
the common benefit exception as an established exception95 and, 
then, rejects the private attorney general theory because it is 
"new."96 As discussed above, the common benefit exception was 
89 Id. at 146. 
90 Id. 
91 In Alyeska, the statutes involved were the Mineral Leasing Act of 1920,30 U.S.C. § 185 
(1982), and the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. § 4321 et. seq. (1982). 
92 The environmental statutes that expressly allow fees include: the Toxic Substance Control 
Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2618(d) (1982); the Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1540 (g)(4) (1982); 
the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1365(d) (1982), the Noise Control Act, 42 U.S.C. (Supp. 
IV.) § 4911(d) (1982). See Ruckelshaus v. Sierra Club, 463 U.S. 680, 682-83 n.1 (1983). 
Two major environmental statutes do not include attorneys fee provisions: The National 
Environmental Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. § 4321 et. seq. (1982), and The Federal Insecticide, 
Fungicide and Rodenticide Act, 7 U.S.C. § 136 et. seq. (1982). 
93 S. Rep. No. 1011, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 4, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONGo & ADMIN. 
NEWS 5908, 5911. 
94 Id. 
96 421 U.S. at 257-60. 
98 Id. at 269. 
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developed in the late 1960's and early 1970's.97 One federal circuit 
court has stated that the common benefit exception was "established" 
in 1973.98 
The equitable private attorney general exception had developed 
at almost the same time. The Alyeska opinion itself cites cases using 
the private attorney general theory dated as early as Lee v. Southern 
Homes99 in 1971. 100 Thus, there is no basis for the Alyeska Court to 
call the private attorney general exception "new" and the common 
benefit theory "traditional." 
It might be argued that the common benefit exception is not new 
since it is an expansion of the common fund theory. 101 This argument 
is not persuasive, however, because awarding fees to a plaintiff out 
of a common fund is quite different from charging fees to a defendant 
directly. While the logic of the common benefit exception supports 
the common fund exception, the logic of the common fund exception 
does not necessarily support the common benefit exception. The 
common fund case exception states that when a plaintiff creates a 
cash pool or protects property for the benefit of others, part of that 
"fund" should pay for the plaintiff's fees. The common benefit ex-
ception is based on a much broader rationale: when a plaintiff pro-
vides a benefit to a class of persons, the burden of obtaining that 
benefit should be shared by those benefited. 102 
The importance of this difference can probably best be appreciated 
when one remembers that the common fund theory originated in 
1881 in Trustees v. Greenough103 and, yet, the common benefit ex-
ception was not developed until 90 years later. Clearly, the Supreme 
Court did not see the step from common fund to common benefit as 
a small one. 
VI. WHY COURTS SHOULD ADOPT THE PRIVATE ATTORNEY 
GENERAL EXCEPTION 
Based on traditional notions of equity, courts have the power to 
award fees under a private attorney general theory. Further, courts 
should award fees to private attorneys general for two reasons. 
First, allowing fee awards to private attorneys general is one way 
97 See supra notes 34-39 and accompanying text. 
9B Christopher v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 644 F.2d 467, 472 (5th Cir. 1981) (Common benefit 
exception was established in Hall v. Cole, 412 U.S. 1 (1973)). 
99 444 F.2d 143 (5th Cir. 1971). 
100 421 U.S. at 270 n.46. 
101 See, e.g., Bradley v. School Bd. of Richmond, 472 F.2d 318,329 (1972). 
102 See supra notes 34-38 and accompanying text. 
103 105 U.S. 527 (1881). 
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for courts to fulfill their duty to enforce the law. Second, courts have 
a duty to use equitable remedies when legal remedies are inade-
quate. 
A. Awarding Attorney's Fees is One Way for Courts to Ensure 
That the Law is Enforced 
Courts have a duty to enforce the law. 104 One method by which 
courts can ensure that the law is enforced is to make fee awards 
available to private plaintiffs who step forward to enforce the law. 
As noted above, 105 private attorneys general must have the resources 
to litigate. Without the resources to pay the costs of litigation, the 
right to come to court to enforce the law is a hollow shell. The 
availability of fee awards provides the resources to private attorneys 
general by giving them the opportunity to recover their fees if they 
win. Also, attorney's fee awards are a source of funds for successful 
plaintiffs to finance future public interest law suits. 106 
Furthermore, fee awards can provide the added incentive for a 
private citizen who would otherwise decide that his personal benefits 
did not justify the great expense of prosecuting a suit. By reducing 
the burden on public interest plaintiffs, courts can lessen the disin-
centives that a private individual faces when he acts to protect 
interests broader than his own self-interest. In doing so, courts 
would encourage public interest plaintiffs to file suits to enforce laws 
that might not be enforced otherwise. 
Finally, the availabilty of fee awards may serve to discourage 
violations of the law. Since fee awards would tend to increase the 
ability of citizens to bring environmental enforcement suits, violators 
may work harder to remain in compliance with environmental re-
strictions. Without fee awards, violators may conclude that their 
actions will rarely be challenged. For the same reasons, the threat 
of citizen's suits and fee awards against the government might stim-
ulate government enforcement. 107 
104 See, e.g., Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 194 (1978). 
One might argue that courts should only decide the cases that are brought to them and 
not encourage litigation. This argument fails, however, because it does not recognize that 
attorney's fee awards only "encourage" lawsuits by removing barriers that discourage parties 
from coming to court. The availability of fee awards do not convince litigants to pull lawsuits 
from thin air simply so they can win attorney's fees. Fee awards merely ensure that parties 
with legitimate grievances can afford to litigate those grievances. 
105 See supra notes 4-5 and accompanying text. 
106 See supra note 5 and accompanying text. 
107 This argument is suggested in ANDERSON, MANDECKER & TARLOCK, ENVIRONMENTAL 
PROTECTION 152 (1984). 
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Both Congress and the courts have stated that fee awards to 
private attorneys general are crucial to full enforcement of the law. lOS 
After the Alyeska decision, Congress passed the Attorney's Fees 
Awards Act,109 which granted fees to public interest plaintiffs in civil 
rights suits. In the Senate report for this law,l1O the Senate Com-
mittee stated that the denial of fee awards to private attorneys 
general created "anomolous gaps" in the civil rights laws. 111 This 
shows that Congress believed that the availability of attorney's fees 
was important to fulfill the public policies expressed in the statutes. 
Congress has also signaled the propriety of fee awards to private 
attorneys general by including fee award provisions in many stat-
utes. Many of the fee provisions use the word "appropriate" as the 
standard for courts to follow. For example, the fee provision of the 
Clean Air Act112 states: "[i]n any judicial proceeding under this sec-
tion, the court may award costs of litigation (including reasonable 
attorney and expert witness fees) whenever it determines that such 
award is appropriate. "113 Similar language is found in many other 
environmental statutes. 114 Courts could reasonably look to statutes 
that state that awarding fees to private attorneys general is appro-
priate in law and decide that awarding fees under statutes without 
fee award provisions is appropriate in equity. This reasoning has 
been accepted by courts in the past115 and is consistent with past 
statements by Congress. 116 
Furthermore, the use of the word "appropriate" should not be 
taken as a mere statutory shorthand for fee awards to private at-
torneys general. Congress used the word "appropriate" in the var-
ious statutes to show its feeling that private attorney general fee 
awards are proper and important. 117 Congress could have chosen to 
state plainly that fee awards to private attorneys general would be 
allowed. Instead, Congress told courts to award fees when it was 
"appropriate" and that fees were "appropriate" when the plaintiff 
acts as a private attorney general. With this congressional definition, 
lOB See supra notes 6-8 and accompanying text. 
109 42 u.s.C. § 1988 (1982). 
110 S. Rep. No. 1011, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 4, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONGo & ADMIN. 
NEWS 5908, 5911. 
III Id. 
11242 U.S.C. § 7601 (1982). 
113 42 U.S.C. § 7607(0 (1982). 
114 See supra note 92. 
115 See supra notes 88-92 and accompanying text. 
116 See supra notes 93-94 and accompanying text. 
117 See supra note 6 and accompanying text. 
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courts acting in equity have a basis for awarding fees to private 
attorneys general. 
Courts have a duty to enforce all laws. As the Alyeska court itself 
argued, courts should not "pick and choose" which laws deserve more 
or less protection. 118 This duty extends to laws that do not contain 
fee award provisions. When courts choose not to allow fee awards 
to those private plaintiffs who litigate to enforce a law, they fail to 
use a mechanism that Congress has stated is necessary for the 
enforcement of laws. In the extreme, by choosing to not award fees, 
the court is acting to "repeal[ ] the [statute] itself by frustrating its 
basic purpose. "119 
B. Courts Should Apply Equitable Remedies When Legal 
Remedies are Inadequate 
A courts' duty to enforce all laws does not lapse simply because a 
remedy in law is not present. Courts have equitable powers and 
should fashion equitable remedies when the available legal remedies 
are insufficient to do justice. 120 
The inadequacy of the remedy in an environmental statute without 
a fee provision, such as NEP A, 121 is demonstrated by comparing it 
to the antitrust laws, which have fee provisions. l22 When a plaintiff 
sues under the antitrust laws, he is often protecting his own eco-
nomic interest as well as the public interest. A typical case involves 
a competitor suing to prevent certain trade practices that have hurt 
the plaintiff's business. l23 In this situation, the plaintiff has a strong 
economic incentive to litigate even without the availability of fee 
awards. Despite this clear economic incentive for plaintiffs to enforce 
the antitrust laws, Congress felt that fee awards were important to 
provide an adequate remedy for antitrust violations. 124 
In environmental cases, this economic incentive is not present. 
Environmental plaintiffs will rarely gain any economic benefits from 
their litigation as antitrust plaintiffs will. Often the outcome of an 
118 421 u.s. at 269. 
119 Hall v. Cole, 412 U.S. at 13 (citing Cole v. Hall, 462 F.2d 777, 780-81 (1972». 
120 See supra notes 24-25 and accompanying text. 
12142 U.S.C. § 4321 et. seq. (1982). 
122 15 U.S.C. § 26 (1982). 
128 See, e.g., Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. 
denied 444 U.S. 1093 (1980) (Berkey accused Eastman Kodak of using its monopoly power in 
the film market to exclude Berkey from the camera and photo-finishing market). 
124 H.R. Rep. No. 499, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 18-20, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONGo & 
ADMIN. NEWS 2572, 2588-90. 
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environmental suit is an injunction without any money damages. If 
fee awards are necessary to provide an adequate remedy in antitrust 
suits where strong economic incentives to litigate exist, it is difficult 
to see how courts can find that adequate legal remedies exist without 
fee awards in environmental cases where few, if any, economic in-
centives to litigate exist. Since the legal remedies for violation of 
environmental laws are often inadequate in the absence of an award 
of attorney's fees, courts should use their equitable powers to award 
attorney's fees. 
A similar comparison can be made between environmental statutes 
and the civil rights laws. The Alyeska decision ended the availability 
of attorney's fee awards for civil rights plaintiffs as well as environ-
mental plaintiffs. Since Alyeska, however, Congress has filled this 
"anomolous gap[ ]"125 in the civil rights laws by passing the Attor-
ney's Fees Awards Act. 126 This statute created a basis in law for 
awarding attorney's fees to civil rights plaintiffs. 
Civil rights plaintiffs, like antitrust plaintiffs, often can expect to 
gain benefits that flow to them directly. When a civil rights plaintiff 
claims discrimination in employment, for example, he is litigating to 
win a personal benefit. He is seeking a job for himself. Of course, 
this litigation has the important indirect effect of preventing discrim-
ination throughout society. Thus, fees are proper to encourage plain-
tifffl to enforce the civil rights laws. Nonetheless, the societal ben-
efits of civil rights suits are indirect because a suit brought by one 
plaintiff does not end discrimination against all others. 
Environmental suits, however, have a direct benefit to society. A 
plaintiff who protects the environment for himself protects it for 
everyone. Furthermore, environmmental plaintiffs do not get spe-
cific personal benefits as civil rights plaintiffs do. The environmental 
plaintiff's benefits are identical to all those who breathe the same 
air, drink the same water, and enjoy the same forests. As above, it 
is hard to see how attorney's fees are not crucial to the enforcement 
of environmental laws when they are crucial to the enforcement of 
civil rights laws. 
The logic behind the attorney's fees provisions in the civil rights 
and antitrust statutes indicates that fee provisions are necessary for 
full enforcement of the environmental statutes. Since Congress has 
not provided for awards of attorney's fees in all environmental stat-
125 S. Rep. No. 1011, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 4, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONGo & ADMIN. 
NEWS 5908, 5911. 
126 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1982). 
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utes, courts should award fees to private attorneys general as an 
exercise of their duty to develop equitable remedies when legal 
remedies are inadequate. 
C. Since Alyeska 
Several developments since Alyeska have made a federal private 
attorney general exception appropriate. First, the federal courts 
have made it clear in recent decisions that the reasoning in Alyeska 
is faulty. As discussed above,127 the Romero-Barcelo decision is an 
outright rejection by the Supreme Court of the Alyeska holding that 
judicial equitable discretion will be removed by implication. Both 
Alyeska and Romero-Barcelo cannot be good law. Logically, the 
Alyeska decision should be overruled because it is an aberration 
from decades of jurisprudence. 
Further, federal courts have continued to act inconsistently by 
granting fee awards under the equitable bad faith and common ben-
efit exceptionsl28 while denying their ability to award fees under the 
private attorney general exception. 129 Courts either have the power 
to create equitable exceptions or they do not. It is incredible that 
the law would be that courts have such power sometimes. Nonethe-
less, that is the law since Alyeska. To be consistent, the courts must 
either recognize the private attorney general exception or strike 
down the bad faith and common benefit exceptions. 
The second development since Alyeska is the Reagan Administra-
tion's doctrine of privatization. Currently, the Reagan Administra-
tion is privatizing many government functions purportedly to let free 
market forces act to increase their efficiency.130 For example, the 
Reagan administration is encouraging private individuals and cor-
porations to run such things as courts, fire departments, and pris-
ons. 131 The purpose is to replace government decision-making with 
private individuals acting under market incentives. Fee awards for 
successful plaintiffs follow this same logic. Plaintiffs will avoid bring-
ing questionable suits because losing plaintiffs will not recover fees. 
Fee awards will encourage only sound lawsuits. Over time, those 
public interest firms that bring winning suits will survive and grow. 
Firms that bring losing suits will not win attorney's fees and will 
127 See supra notes 83-87 and accompanying text. 
128 See supra note 73. 
129 See supra note 65. 
130 Koepp, PUBLIC SERVICE, PRIVATE PARTIES, Time, Feb. 10, 1986 at 64-66. 
131Id. at 64-65. 
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either grow more responsible or fade away for lack of funds. Thus, 
those firms that are providing the most benefits to society by bring-
ing meritorious suits will be rewarded and supported. Those firms 
that are cluttering courts with nuisance suits will not. 
Finally, since Alyeska, California has developed as an example of 
how a court system can incorporate the private attorney general 
exception. 132 Two years after the Alyeska decision, in Serrano v. 
Priest,l33 the Supreme Court of California held that an award of fees 
to the plaintiffs was proper under the private attorney general the-
ory. This decision was made despite the fact that that there was no 
applicable statute that provided for a fee award for the plaintiff and 
despite section 1021 of the California Code of Civil Procedure which 
limited fee awards to situations provided for in statute or in agree-
ments between the parties. 134 The court based its allowance of fees 
under the private attorney general theory on its inherent equitable 
power to create exceptions to the general rule of section 1021. 135 
In Serrano, the court noted three factors which should be consid-
ered in granting fees under a private attorney general exception: 
(1) the strength or societal importance of the public policy vin-
dicated by the litigation, (2) the necessity for private enforce-
ment and the magnitude of the resultant burden on the plaintiff, 
(3) the number of people standing to benefit from the decision. 136 
132 Most states have yet to address this issue. A Minnesota court has, in dicta, stated that 
the private attorney general exception is one of the "established" exceptions, along with the 
bad faith and common benefit exceptions. Senior Citizens Coalition v. Minnesota Public Util-
ities Comm'n, 355 N.W.2d 295,302 n.10 (Minn. 1984). 
Some states have followed Alyeska and have expressly denied the private attorney general 
exception. These include Alabama; Shelby County v. Smith, 372 So.2d 1092, 1097 (Ala. 1979); 
Illinois; Hamer v. Kirk, 64 Ill. 2d 434, 441 (1976); Massachusetts; Bournewood Hosp. v. 
Massachusetts Comm'n. Against Discrimination, 371 Mass. 303, 311, 358 N.E.2d 235, 240 
(1978); Rhode Island; Providence Journal Co. v. Mason, 116 R.I. 614, 625-6 (1976); and South 
Dakota, Van Emmerik v. Montana-Dakota Utilities Co. ,332 N.W.2d 279,284 (S.D. 1983). 
While state courts are not bound by U.S. Supreme Court decisions, state courts are often 
persuaded by U.S. Supreme Court opinions. To a large extent, the number of state courts 
that followed Alyeska is indicative of this persuasiveness. 
133 20 Cal. 3d 25, 569 P.2d 1303 (1977). 
134 Section 1021 of the California Code of Civil Procedure states, in part: "Except as attor-
ney's fees are specifically provided for by statute, the measure and mode of compensation of 
attorneys ... is left to the agreement, express or implied, of the parties .... " Cal. Civ. 
Proc. Code § 1021 (West 1980). 
135 20 Cal. 3d at 34, 569 P.2d at 1306. 
136 [d. at 45, 569 P.2d at 1314. 
The court left out a fourth factor that Justice Marshall suggested in his dissent in Alyeska: 
the extent to which shifting the fees to the defendant would serve to place them on the class 
benefited. Alyeska, 421 U.S. at 285. The Serrano court properly noted that this fourth factor 
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Since the Serrano decision, California has enacted a statute that 
codifies the court decisions allowing fees to be awarded to private 
attorneys general. 137 The experience in California shows that it is 
possible to develop the private attorney general exception so that it 
encourages private parties to bring meritorious suits without cre-
ating an incentive to bring nuisance suits and without undermining 
the no fees rule. l38 
VII. CONCLUSION 
Allowing fee awards under a private attorney general exception 
will provide benefits beyond financial support for public interest 
plaintiffs and greater enforcement of the laws. Fee awards to private 
attorneys general will broaden participation in our governmental 
system. Making fee awards available to public interest plaintiffs is 
right for the same reason that poll taxes are wrong: a democracy 
cannot function properly when participation is based on wealth. The 
availability of fee awards allows more citizens to have access to the 
courts. 
The no fees rule fit a time when the typical lawsuit pitted one 
private economic interest against another private economic interest. 
This model still fits the majority of cases, but today there is a 
would turn the PAG theory into a common benefit theory. Id. at 45 n.16, 569 P.2d at 1314 
n.16. 
137 Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 1021.5 (West 1980). That section states: 
Upon motion, a court may award attorney's fees to a successful party against one or 
more opposing parties in any action which has resulted in the enforcement of an 
important right affecting the public interest if: (a) a significant benefit, whether 
pecuniary or nonpecuniary, has been conferred on the general public or a large class 
of persons, (b) the necessity and financial burden of private enforcement are such as 
to make the award appropriate, and (c) such fees should not in the interest of justice 
be paid out of the recovery if any . . . . 
One might argue that this statute indicates that the private attorney general exception in 
California is a legislative exception to the no fees rule, not a court created exception. The 
Supreme Court of California, however, has stated otherwise. In Woodland Hills v. Los An-
geles, 23 Cal. 3d 917, 593 P.2d 200 (1979), the court stated that ''the legislature adopted 
section 1021.5 as a codification of the 'Private Attorney General' attorney fee doctrine that 
had been developed in numerous prior judicial decisions." Id. at 933, 593 P.2d at 208. The 
court has affirmed this view in several opinions since Woodland Hills. See, e.g., Gray v. Don 
Miller & Associates, Inc., 35 Cal. 3d 498, 505, 674 P.2d 253, 257 (1984) (private attorney 
general exception was "created by courts pursuant to their inherent equitable powers ... "). 
Statutory authorization has followed Press v. Lucky Stores, 34 Cal. 3d 311,317,667 P.2d 704, 
707 (1983) ("[S]ection 1021.5 is a codification of the Private Attorney General doctrine adopted 
by this court in [Serrano],,). 
188 For a discussion of the private attorney general theory in California, see, Thomas, The 
Private Attorney General In California-An Evolution OJ The Species, 18 San Diego L. Rev. 
843 (1981). 
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growing number of suits in which private individuals are fighting for 
causes that are not based on economic interest. The general no fees 
rule should be retained for most cases so as not to discourage parties 
with private economic interests from bringing their disputes to 
court. 139 At the same time, the private attorney general exception 
should be adopted for a similar reason, so that public interest plain-
tiffs are not discouraged from coming to court to enforce the law. 
139 See supra text accompanying note 21. 
